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The Concept of  lndexation  in the 
History  of  Economic Thought 
Periods  of  severe  monetary  disturbance  tend  to 
spawn  unorthodox  and  often  ingenious  stabilization 
schemes.  During  such  episodes,  conventional  policies 
often  appear  inadequate  and  the  situation  seems  to 
call  for  extraordinary  remedies.  Thus,  for  example, 
the  Great  Depression  of  the  1930’s  inspired  a host  of 
novel  schemes-including  stamped  money,  taxation  of 
idle  hoards,  100 percent  reserve  requirements  behind 
demand  deposits,  security  reserve  proposals,  com- 
modity  reserve  currency,  “social  credit”  remedies,  and 
the  like-all  designed  to  promote  the  recovery  that 
monetary  policy  was  thought  incapable  of accomplish- 
ing  by  itself.  Currently  the  major  economic  problem 
is  inflation,  virulent  double-digit  inflation  seemingly 
unstoppable  by  orthodox  measures  alone.  Predict- 
ably,  several  inflation-combating  expedients  have 
been  suggested.  These  include  such  prescriptions  as : 
the  reinstitution  of  wage  and  price  controls,  the 
levying  of  profit  surtaxes  on  corporations  granting 
“excessive”  or  “inflationary”  wage  increases,  and 
the  institution  of  so-called  “social  contract”  arrange- 
ments  whereby  labor  would  agree  to  restrain  its wage 
demands  in  return  for  a  reduction  in  its  tax  burden. 
Perhaps  the  most  controversial  proposal  for  fight- 
ing  inflation,  however,  is  indexation,  i.e.,  the  idea  of 
inflation-proofing  the  economy  by  tying  monetary 
contracts  to  a  general  price  index.  Under  compre- 
hensive  or  widespread  indexation,  most  nominal 
values  would  be  adjusted  automatically  to  compen- 
sate  for  inflation.  Currently,  indexation  is  being 
touted  in  some  quarters  as  the  best  means  of  helping 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  bring  inflation  under  con- 
trol.  Led  by  Milton  Friedman,  proponents  of  index- 
ation  propose  that  escalator  clauses  be applied  volun- 
tarily  in  the  private  sector  to  all  contractual  debts 
and  to  most  incomes,  whether  labor  (wage  and 
salaries)  or  investment  (interest  and  dividend)  in- 
comes.  Moreover,  Friedman  urges  that  mandatory 
indexation  be  applied  to  the  borrowing  and  taxing 
arrangements  of  the  federal  government.  Specifi- 
cally,  Friedman  would  require  that  all  government 
securities  contain  purchasing-power  guarantees  and 
that  the  personal  and  corporation  income  tax  systems 
include  compulsory  and  automatic  inflationary  ad- 
justment  of  tax  brackets,  personal  exemptions,  asset 
depreciation  schedules,  and  capital  gains. 
Such  comprehensive  indexing,  Friedman  claims, 
would  have  at  least  two  therapeutic  effects.  First,  he 
says,  “it  would  reduce  the  revenue  the  government 
acquires  from  inflation”  thus  weakening  the  govern- 
ment’s  “incentive  to  inflate.”  Second,  and  more  im- 
portant,  indexation,  in  his  words,  “would  reduce  the 
adverse  side  effects  that  effective  measures  to  end 
inflation  would  have  on  output  and  employment.” 
[8 ;  94]  Constituting  the  most  serious  obstacle  to 
the  ending  of  inflation,  these  harmful  side  effects 
stem  from  institutional  and  expectational  rigidities 
built  into  the  structure  of  commodity  and  factor 
prices.  By  preventing  some  prices  from  adjusting 
as  fast  as  others  to  policy-induced  declines  in  the 
rate  of  total  spending,  these  rigidities  act  to  distort 
or  alter  relative  prices  (i.e.,  market  exchange  ratios 
or  relationships  among  individual  commodity  and 
factor  prices),  thus  influencing  quantities  of  real 
variables.  For  example,  such  influences  as long-term 
labor  and  debt  contracts;  lags  in  the  adjustment 
of  price  expectations,  and  money  illusion  may  cause 
nominal  wage  and  interest  rates  to  lag  behind 
changes  in  product  prices.  The  failure  of  these 
money  costs  to  adjust  fully  and  instantaneously  to 
price  level  changes  would  result  in  an  alteration  of 
real  wage  and  interest  rates,  thereby  affecting  em- 
ployers’  demands  for  labor  and  capital.  Indexation, 
Friedman  argues,  would  eliminate  these  inflexibili- 
ties,  thus  rendering  relative  prices  (e.g.,  real  wage 
and  interest  rates)  and  the  corresponding  real  eco- 
nomic  variables  (output,  employment,  and  the  rate 
of  capital  accumulation)  immune  from  policy-engi- 
neered  changes  in the  rate  of inflation.  In  short,  with 
indexing,  the  economy  could  move  swiftly  to  a  lower 
inflationary  equilibrium  without  having  to  endure  a 
prolonged  transitional  period  of low  economic  growth 
and  high  unemployment. 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  Friedman  does  not 
claim  that  indexation  by  itself  would  lower  the  rate 
of inflation.  Instead,  he argues  that  indexation  would 
augment  the  effectiveness  of existing  anti-inflationary 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  That  is,  by  alleviating 
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ation  would  increase  the  willingness  of  the  authori- 
ties  to  employ  conventional  demand-management 
policies. 
Friedman’s  controversial  proposal  has  been  widely 
hailed  as both  novel  and  radical.  As  Friedman  him- 
self  acknowledges,  however,  the  truth  is  that  pro- 
posals  to  link  money  payments  to  a  cost-of-living 
index  are  neither  radical  nor  new.  Such  proposals 
have  a  long  history,  dating  back  at  least  to  the  mid- 
18th  century.  Thus,  for  example,  the  idea  of  index- 
ation  received  official  endorsement  and  was  embodied 
in  Massachusetts  legislation  in  the  1740’s.  And  as 
early  as the  1780’s,  indexation  was  actually  employed 
as  a  policy  experiment  when  the  Massachusetts  gov- 
ernment  attempted  to  link  soldiers’  wages  to  an  aver- 
age  of  the  prices  of  four  staple  commodities.  More- 
over,  the  concept  appears  prominently  in  the  writings 
of  19th  and  20th  century  classical  and  neo-classical 
economists  who  analyzed  it  under  the  heading  of  the 
so-called  “tabular  standard  of  value,”  referring  to 
the  table  or  list  of  specific  commodities  whose  prices 
were  to  enter  the  cost-of-living  index  serving  as  the 
standard  of  deferred  payments.  Even  the  more 
unusual  features  of  Friedman’s  proposal-e.g.,  his 
plan  to  index  taxes  and  the  government  debt  and  his 
vision  of  a  comprehensively-indexed  as  distinct  from 
a  partially-indexed  economy-were  fully  anticipated 
in  earlier  writings,  as  were  his  arguments  (1)  that 
indexation  insulates  employment  and  production  from 
the  harmful  effects  of  unanticipated  changes  in  the 
price  level  or  its  rate  of  increase,  and  (2)  that  index- 
ation  prevents  the  government  from  diverting  via 
taxation  an  increasing  share  of  resources  from 
the  private  sector.  In  short,  neither  the  idea  of 
indexation  nor  the  arguments  offered  in  support  of 
it  are  new. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  document  this 
latter  assertion.  Accordingly,  following  a  brief  de- 
scription  of  some  early  experiments  with  index- 
linking  arrangements,  the  article  will  examine  the 
writings  of  pertinent  classical  and  neoclassical  econ- 
omists  to  see  what  they  had  to  say  about  the  subject. 
Finally,  a  concluding  section  compares  Friedman’s 
propositions  regarding  indexation  with  those  of  his 
classical,  neo-classical,  and  modern  predecessors  in 
order  to  demonstrate  their  essential  similarity. 
INDEXATION  IN  THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Means  have  long  been  sought  for  protecting  the 
real  value  of  time  contracts  from  fluctuations  in  the 
value  of  money.  One  solution  is  to  tie  contractual 
payments  to  the  particular  price  of  a  specific  com- 
modity,  such  as wheat  or  gold,  whose  value  presum- 
ably  varies  less  than  that  of  money.  This  solution  is 
tantamount  to  guaranteeing  payment  in  terms  of  a 
fixed  amount  of the  commodity.  For  while  the  price- 
linked  money  payments  may  vary,  they  would  always 
be  just  sufficient  to  purchase  a  constant  quantity  of 
the  specified  commodity. 
The  practice  of  linking  contractual  payments  to  a 
specific  price  has  a  long  tradition  extending  back  at 
least  to  Elizabethan  times.  Thus,  William  Stanley 
Jevons  remarks  that  during  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  I, 
the  colleges  of  Oxford,  Cambridge,  and  Eton  were 
required  by  law  to  lease  out  their  lands  for  corn 
rents,  i.e.,  variable  money  rents  linked  to  the  price 
of  corn.  [9 ;  326]  Irving  Fisher  notes  that  corn 
rents  were  fairly  well  established  in  Scotland  by  the 
end  of  the  17th  century.  [3 ;  334]  And  Alfred 
Marshall  refers  to  the  linking  of  church  tithes  to  the 
price  of  grain.  [12;  197]  Moreover,  during  the 
post-World  War  I  hyperinflation  in  Germany  in  the 
early  1920’s,  contracts  of  all  types  were  tied  to  the 
price  of  rye.  As  another  example,  bonds  containing 
so-called  gold  clauses  linking  principal  and  interest 
to  the  price  of  gold  were  in  common  use  during  the 
19th  and  early  20th  centuries.  In  short,  the  use  of 
purchasing-power  guarantees  stipulated  in  terms  of a 
single  specific  commodity  is  a  fairly  old  practice. 
The  linking  of  debt  payments  to  one  particular 
price,  however,  does  not  constitute  true  indexation, 
the  essence  of  which  is  the  use  of  a  price  index,  or 
weighted  average  of  many  prices,  as  the  standard  of 
deferred  payments.  The  genesis  of  the  indexation 
concept  can  be  traced  to  Bishop  William  Fleetwood’s 
pioneering  study,  Chronicon  Preciosum:  or,  an  Ac- 
count  of English  Money  (1707).  In  that  work  Fleet- 
wood  made  at  least  two  original  contributions.  He 
was  the  first  to  make  systematic  use  of  several  prices 
to measure  changes  in the  value  of money.  Observing 
that  the  particular  prices  of  corn,  meat,  drink,  and 
cloth  had  all  shown  a roughly  six-fold  increase  during 
the  preceding  two-and-a-half  centuries,  he  concluded 
that  the  value  of  money  had  depreciated  in  the  ratio 
of  six  to  one.  Here  is  the  origin  of  the  concept  of  a 
cost-of-living  index  as  a  measure  of  changes  in  the 
purchasing  power  of money.  Second,  Fleetwood  sug- 
gested  that  the  index  number  could  be  used  to  deter- 
mine  the  amount  of nominal  income  corresponding  to 
any  given  fixed  real  income.  This  suggestion  emerged 
from  his  attempt  to  establish  the  maximum  money 
income  a person  could  receive  and  still  be  eligible  for 
a  certain  fellowship.  The  fellowship  was  limited  to 
those  with  real  incomes  not  exceeding  the  purchasing 
power  of  £5  in  1450,  the  year  the  scholarship  was 
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that  of  finding  the  current  nominal  income  whose 
price-deflated  or  real  value  was  equivalent  to  a  given 
constant-dollar  base  or  reference  period  sum  of  £5. 
His  solution  marks,  perhaps,  the  genesis  of  the  idea 
of  linking  money  incomes  to  a  price  index  in  order 
to  stabilize  their  real  value. 
The  concept  of  indexation  received  its  first  official 
endorsement  in  1747  when  the  legislature  of  colonial 
Massachusetts  legalized  the  linking  of  debts  to  a 
broadly  based  measure  of  the  cost  of  living,  while 
simultaneously  prohibiting  the  tying  of  debts  solely 
to  the  particular  prices  of  specific  commodities.  The 
question  of  the  validity  of  individual  or  particular 
prices  vs.  general  prices  as  the  basis  for  deferred 
payments  arose  in  the  following  way.  After  the 
passage  in  1742  of  a  law  permitting  the  practice, 
many  debts  payable  in  Massachusetts  currency  had 
been  linked  to the  prices  of silver  and  London  bills  of 
exchange.  By  1747,  however,  it  was  apparent  that 
this  arrangement  had  been  unduly  burdensome  for 
debtors.  During  this  period,  the  prices  of  silver  and 
foreign  exchange  had  risen  much  more  than  had  the 
general  price  level.  Consequently,  debtors  were 
forced  to  repay  larger  sums  to  creditors  than  they 
would  have  if  debts  had  been  linked  to  a  general 
price  index.  As  the  legislature  put  it,  Massachu- 
setts  currency,  “to  the  great  grievance  of  debtors,” 
was  “much  depreciated  with  respect  to  bills  of  ex- 
change  and  silver,”  although  it  had  maintained  its 
purchasing  power  “with  respect  to  all  other  com- 
modities  and  merchandises  in  this  province.”  [5 ; 
426] 
On  the  basis  of  this  experience,  the  Massachusetts 
legislature  concluded  that  the  real  value  of  debts 
could  not  “be  truly  estimated  by  the  prices  of  one  or 
two  particular  commodities  or  merchandises,  such 
as  bills  of exchange  or  silver  . . .” since  these  specific 
prices  were  not  representative  of  the  average  of  all 
commodity  prices.  To  remedy  this  defect,  the  legis- 
lature  passed  an  amendment  stating  that  thereafter 
in  applying  monetary  correction  to  debts,  “regard 
shall  be  had  not  only  to  silver  and  bills  of  exchange, 
but  to  the  prices  of  provisions  and  other  necessaries 
of  life.”  [5 ; 426]  Here  is the  first  legal  recognition 
of  the  principle  that  indexation  should  involve  the 
use  of  purchasing-power  guarantees  stated  in  terms 
of  general  prices  rather  than  particular  prices. 
The  first  practical  application  of  indexation-as 
opposed  to  the  mere  legal  recognition  of the  concept- 
came  during  the  American  Revolution  when  the 
Massachusetts  legislature  decided  to  link  soldiers’ 
wages  to  a  crude  index  comprised  of  an  average  of 
the  prices  of four  staple  commodities-namely,  “Beef, 
Indian  Corn,  Sheeps  Wool  and  sole  Leather.”  [5 ; 
435-6]  This  index,  the  so-called  “Table  of  Depreci- 
ation,”  was  used  to  determine  the  additional  wages 
owing  to  the  soldiers  in  order  to  compensate  them 
fully  for  the  inflation-induced  erosion  of  the  pur- 
chasing  power  of  their  stipulated  enlistment  wages. 
This  was,  perhaps,  the  first  attempt  to  link  wages 
to  a  cost-of-living  index. 
This  episode  also  produced  the  first  experiment 
with  an  index-linked  government  bond,  i.e.,  a  state- 
issued  financial  obligation  carrying  a  purchasing- 
power  guarantee.  These  bonds  were  issued  as  part 
of  the  wage-adjustment  scheme.  More  specifically, 
the  additional  wage  compensation  was  to  be  paid  to 
the  soldiers,  not  in  cash,  but  in  the  form  of  one-to- 
eight-year  interest-bearing  bonds  known  as  “soldier 
depreciation  notes.”  [5 ; 436-7]  Both  principal  and 
interest  on  these  notes  were  tied  to  the  cost-of-living 
index,  thereby  guaranteeing  yields  as  well  as  re- 
demption  value  in  terms  of  real  purchasing  power. 
The  total  volume  of  these  notes  issued  is not  known, 
although  it  has  been  estimated  that  between  one  and 
two  million  gold  dollars’  worth  were  outstanding  in 
1781.  [5 ; 442]  Evidently  the  practice  of  applying 
a  monetary  correction  to  wages  and  salaries  and 
then  paying  it  off  in  the  form  of  a  purchasing-power 
bond  proved  to  be  an  attractive  expedient,  for  it  was 
extended  to  the  incomes  of  some  civilians,  including 
the  President  of  Harvard  College,  who  received  al- 
most  £500  in  such  notes  in  1780.  [5 ; 448-9] 
These  experiments  indicate  that  the  concept  of 
indexation  was  fairly  well  established  by  the  1780’s. 
It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  indexation  was 
not  viewed  by  its  18th  century  proponents  as  an 
economic  stabilizer.  In  fact,  the  sole  rationale  given 
for  the  practice  was  that  of  offsetting  the  inequity 
arising  from  inflation.  Not  until  the  early  19th  cen- 
tury  was  it  claimed  that  indexation  might  have  some 
therapeutic  effects  on  output,  employment,  and  the 
level  of  economic  activity. 
CLASSICAL  PROPONENTS  OF  INDEXATION 
Joseph  Lowe  and  G.  Poulett  Scrope,  two  minor 
economists  of  the  19th  century  British  classical 
school,  were  the  first  to  argue  that,  in  addition  to 
correcting  inequity  arising  from  inflation  and  defla- 
tion,  indexation  might  also  have  a  stabilizing  impact 
on  real  economic  variables.  Thus,  Lowe,  in  a  section 
of  his  book  The  Present  State  of  England  (1822) 
devoted  to  a  “Plan  for  lessening  the  Injury  arising 
from  the  Fluctuations  of  Prices,”  said  that  index- 
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more  willing  to  grant  wage  increases  in  times  of 
inflation,  thereby  forestalling  wage  disputes,  strikes, 
and  work  stoppages  that  might  interrupt  production. 
He  also  contended  that  indexation  of  wage  contracts 
would  make  workers  more  willing  to  accept  money 
wage  cuts  in  times  of  falling  prices.  Lowe  claimed 
that,  ordinarily,  workers  would  resist  cuts  in  money 
wages  because  they  feared  that  wages,  once  lowered, 
would  not  be  raised  again  in  periods  of  inflation. 
Thus,  by  trying  to  protect  against  possible  future 
declines  in  real  wages,  workers  would  maintain 
money  wages  at  unwarranted  high  levels  in  periods 
of  deflation.  Indexation,  however,  by  insuring  the 
constancy  of  real  wages  over  alternating  periods  of 
deflation  and  inflation,  would  induce  workers  to 
accept  money  wage  cuts  when  prices  fell.  [11;  335-8] 
One  important  implication  of  Lowe’s  analysis,  al- 
though  not  explicitly  mentioned  by  him,  is  that  in- 
dexation,  by  increasing  the  downward  flexibility  of 
money  wages,  would  help  maintain  full  employment 
during  episodes  of  falling  prices. 
Lowe  also  argued  that  the  use  of purchasing-power 
guarantees  would  eliminate  an  important  element  of 
risk  from  business  decision-making-namely,  the  risk 
of  unforeseen  changes  in  the  value  of  money.  The 
elimination  of  this  risk,  he  thought,  would  have  a 
beneficial  impact  on  both  economic  growth  and  allo- 
cative  efficiency.  For  example,  he  said  that  index- 
ation  of  land-rent  agreements  would  encourage  land- 
lords  and  tenants  to  enter  into  long-term  leases  con- 
ducive  to  improvements  in  agricultural  productivity. 
[11;  338-9]  Similarly,  he  believed  that  the  insertion 
of  purchasing-power  clauses  in  stocks  and  bonds 
would  decrease  the  risk  and  improve  the  market- 
ability  of  these  securities,  thereby  promoting  the  de- 
velopment  of  the  capital  market.  [11 ;  341-4]  In 
general,  Lowe  argued  that  indexation  would  diminish 
the  risk  of  uncertainty  associated  with  fluctuations 
in the  value  of money,  thereby  increasing  productivity 
and  growth.  In  his  own  words,  “the  removal  of  un- 
certainty  from  time  contracts  would  contribute  very 
effectively  to  the  extension  of  our  national  industry.” 
[11;  345] 
G.  Poulett  Scrope  was  the  first  economist  to  use 
the  phrase  “tabular  standard  of  value”  to  designate 
indexation.  This  phrase  appears  first  in  his  1833 
pamphlet,  An  Examination  of  the  Bank  Charter 
Question  and  again  in  his  Principles  of  Political 
Economy  (1833).  The  tabular  standard,  of  course, 
referred  to  the  table  or  list  of  commodity  prices 
whose  weighted  average  formed  the  index  number 
used  in  index-linked  contracts.  Scrope  distinguished 
between  the  medium  of  exchange,  unit  of  account, 
and  store  of  value  functions  of  money,  maintaining 
that  the  latter  two  functions  might  advantageously 
be  divorced  from  money  and  assigned  to  the  tabular 
standard.  He  argued  that  the  tabular  standard,  as 
the  least  variable  of  all  possible  standards  of  value, 
would  perform  these  functions  more  reliably  than 
money,  whose  value  was  variable  and  unpredictable. 
Following  Lowe,  Scrope  claimed  that  adoption  of the 
tabular  standard  would  have  at  least  two  salutary 
impacts  on  economic  activity.  First,  it  would  pro- 
mote  industry  by  reducing  a  burdensome  form  of 
business  risk,  i.e.,  the  risk  of  unexpected  changes  in 
the  future  level  of  prices.  For  as  he  put  it,  “It  is 
for  the  interest  of  industry  and  commerce  that  the 
risk  of  an  unforeseen  change  in  the  value  of  the 
standard  should  not  be  superadded  to  the  other  ele- 
ments  of  uncertainty  to  which  all  industrious  and 
commercial  speculations  are  .  .  .  exposed.”  [13; 
413-4]  Second,  and  more  important,  the  tabular 
standard  would  protect  business  profit  and  wealth 
from  deflation-induced  rises  in  the  real  burden  of 
debt  and  other  fixed  costs.  Specifically,  Scrope 
argued  that  unless  taxes,  rents,  debts,  and  other 
fixed  charges  against  operating  revenue  were  in- 
dexed,  a falling  price  level  would  erode  business  profit 
and  redistribute  real  wealth  from  productive  debtor- 
entrepreneurs  to  unproductive  creditor-rentiers,  thus 
tending  to  discourage  production  and  economic  ex- 
pansion.  [13;  405-13]  Without  indexation,  said 
Scrope,  a  deflation-induced  transfer  of  profit  and 
wealth  “must  both  check  the  desire  to  improve,  and 
diminish  the  means  of  improvement.”  Elsewhere  he 
says  that  unless  profits  are  protected  by  the  adoption 
of  the  tabular  standard,  “the  main  inducement  to 
industry  is destroyed.”  [13 ; 410] 
Two  further  observations  should  be  made  regard- 
ing  the  classical  proponents  of  indexation.  First, 
they  did  not  claim  that  indexation  by  itself  would 
stabilize  the  price  level.  Lowe,  in  fact,  denied  that 
fluctuations  in  the  price  level  could  be  prevented  by 
any  means.  Scrope,  on  the  other  hand,  thought  that 
price  stability  could  be  attained,  but  only  via  proper 
management  of  the  money  supply.  And,  although 
he  hinted  that  the  price  index  might  serve  as  a  guide 
or  indicator  for  the  monetary  authority  to  use  in 
regulating  the  money  stock,  he  emphasized  that  it 
was  the  control  of  the  money  supply  itself  that  was 
the  essential  prerequisite  for  price  stability.  [13; 
418-9]  For  the  most  part,  these  writers  regardled 
indexation  not  as  an  instrument  for  stabilizing  the 
price  level,  but  rather  as  a  means  of  insulating  the 
economic  system  and  the  level  of  economic  activity 
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the  value  of  money. 
The  second  comment  concerns  the  other  contribu- 
tions  of  the  classical  writers  to  the  theory  and  prac- 
tice  of  indexation.  These  contributions  should  not 
be  overlooked.  First  was  the  analysis-albeit  rudi- 
mentary-of  technical  problems  of  constructing  the 
appropriate  index  to  use  in  index-linked  contracts. 
Classical  analysts  discussed  such  matters  as:  sources 
of  data,  the  selection  of  representative  commodities 
and  weights,  and  the  number  of  prices  to  enter  in 
the  index.  Scrope,  for  example,  thought  the  index 
should  contain  “the  prices  of  one  hundred  articles  in 
general  request  ;  {weighted  by]  quantities  deter- 
mined  by  the  proportionate  consumption  of  each 
article.”  [13 ; 406.  See  also  11;  333-6  and  Appendix 
p. 94-7] 
The  second  and  perhaps  more  important  contribu- 
tion  was  the  proposal  for  more  widespread  index- 
ation.  Thus  Lowe  described  the  benefits  that  would 
follow  from  the  indexation  of  rents,  salaries,  wages, 
leases,  annuities,  securities,  and  other  time  contracts, 
including  the  public  debt.  In  a similar  fashion  Scrope 
wrote  that  the  tabular  standard  could  be  used  to 
regulate  all  “pecuniary  engagements.”  It  should  be 
pointed  out,  however,  that  while  recommending  more 
widespread  use  of  indexation,  these  authors  advo- 
cated  that  the  application  of purchasing-power  clauses 
be  strictly  optional  and  voluntary,  rather  than  com- 
pulsory  or  mandatory.  Scrope,  for  example,  said 
that  contracting  parties  should  have  complete  freedom 
to  accept  or  reject  the  tabular  standard,  using  it  only 
“if  they  chose”  or  “if they  shall  think  fit.”  Those  who 
wisely  wished  to  hedge  or  insure  against  the  hazards 
of unanticipated  fluctuations  in the  value  of money  or, 
in  his  own  words,  “to  run  no  risks  of  its  variation 
either  way,”  could  use  indexation  “to  confer  on  the 
sum  specified  a  uniformity  and  permanency  of  value, 
by  changing  its  numerical  amount  in  proportion  to 
the  change  in  its  power  of purchase.”  On  the  other 
hand,  those  who  opted  for  unindexed  contracts  stated 
in  terms  of  fixed  amounts  of  the  nominal  monetary 
unit  “would  do  so with  their  eyes  open  to  its  possible 
fluctuations.”  Voluntary  choice  of  the  unindexed 
monetary  unit  as  the  standard  of  deferred  payments 
would  imply  “acquiescence  in  the  chances  attendant 
on  its  use.”  [13 ; 407-S]  In  short,  Lowe  and  Scrope 
favored  the  extension  of indexation,  but  only  if it  was 
consistent  with  the  laissez-faire  principles  of  19th 
century  classical  liberalism.  Nevertheless,  the  vision 
of  permanent  and  pervasive  voluntary  use  of  the 
tabular  standard  represents  a  significant  step  from 
the  18th  century  view  of indexation  as a govemment- 
imposed  temporary  emergency  measure  applicable,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  “soldier  depreciation  notes,”  to  a 
limited  range  of  payments. 
NEO-CLASSICAL  VIEWS  OF  INDEXATION 
The  subject  of  indexation  is a prominent  theme  in 
the  monetary  literature,  both  theoretical  and  policy- 
oriented,  of  the  neoclassical  period,  which  runs 
roughly  from  1870  to  1930.  Some  of  the  leading 
neo-classical  economists,  including  William  Stanley 
Jevons,  Alfred  Marshall,  Irving  Fisher,  Francis  Y. 
Edgeworth,  and  Francis  Amasa  Walker,  expounded 
on  the  subject  of  indexation  and,  in  many  cases, 
enthusiastically  endorsed  it  as  a  remedy  for  mone- 
tary  instability. 
The  neo-classical  proponents  of  indexation  ob- 
viously  derived  many  of  their  ideas  from  their  classi- 
cal  forebears.  For  one  thing,  they  shared  the  latters’ 
vision  of  a widely  indexed  economy.  Then  too,  their 
discussion  of  indexation  proceeded  along  the  lines 
opened  up  by  their  classical  predecessors.  In  fact, 
the  chief  neo-classical  contribution  to  the  theory  and 
practice  of  indexation  consisted  of  the  clarification, 
refinement,  restatement,  coordination,  and  elabora- 
tion  of  the  ideas  of  earlier  proponents  of  the  tabular 
standard.  Specifically,  much  of  the  neo-classical 
analysis  of indexation  was  devoted  to considering  (1) 
the  impact  of  indexation  on  output  and  employment 
and  (2)  technical  problems  concerning  the  compila- 
tion  of  a  suitable  price  index  number-the  two  main 
topics  occupying  the  attention  of  Lowe  and  Scrope. 
But  although  the  various  neo-classical  writers  were 
in  broad  agreement  on  the  main  issues  concerning 
indexation  and  its  effects  on  the  economic  system, 
their  analyses  and  policy  prescriptions  frequently 
differed  in  specific  details.  These  differences  are 
significant  enough  to  warrant  separate  examination 
of  their  views,  particularly  the  views  of  Jevons, 
Marshall,  and  Fisher,  the  leading  neoclassical  ex- 
positors  of  the  indexation  concept. 
William  Stanley  Jevons  The  earliest  neo-classi- 
cal  economist  to  revive  the  topic  of  indexation  was 
Jevons,  who  devoted  the  entire  Chapter  25  of  his 
Money  and  the  Mechanism  of  Exchange  (1876)  to 
the  discussion  of  “A  Tabular  Standard  of  Value.” 
After  acknowledging  his  indebtedness  to  Lowe  and 
Scrope  for  providing  the  inspiration  for  the  chapter, 
Jevons  proceeded  to  advocate  that  a  government 
agency  similar  to  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  be 
created  to  compile  the  index  number  to  be  used  in 
correcting  money  contracts. 
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permanent  government  commission  would  have  to 
be  created  .  .  .  .  The  officers  of  the  department 
would  collect  the  current  prices  of  commodities  in 
all the principal  markets  of  the kingdom,  and, by a 
well-defined  system  of  calculations,  would  compute 
from  these data  the  average  variations  in the pur- 
chasing  power  of  gold.  The  decisions  of  this  com- 
mission  would  be published monthly,  and payments 
would  be adjusted  in accordance  with  them.  Thus, 
suppose  that  a  debt  of  one  hundred  pounds  was 
incurred  upon the first  of  July,  1875, and was to be 
paid back  on the first  of  July,  1878;  if  the commis- 
sion  had  decided  in  June,  1878, that  the  value  of 
gold  had  fallen  in  the  ratio  of  106 to  100  in  the 
intervening  years,  then the creditor  would  claim an 
increase  of  6 percent  in the nominal  amount  of  the 
debt.  [9;  330-1] 
As  to  the  question  of whether  indexation  should  be 
optional  or  mandatory,  Jevons  argued  that  after  a 
trial  period  in  which  “the  practicability  and  utility  of 
the  plan  had  become  sufficiently  demonstrated,”  it 
should  “be  made  compulsory.”  On  this  point  he 
differed  from  his  classical  predecessors,  who  advo- 
cated  voluntary  indexation.  But  he  agreed  with  them 
in  favoring  widespread  if  not  completely  comprehen- 
sive  indexation.  Thus,  he  proposed  that  the  tabular 
standard  be  applied  to  “every  money  debt  of,  say, 
more  than  three  months’  standing.”  This  criterion 
would  cover  most  short-term  as  well  as all  long-term 
debts.  [9;  331] 
Jevons  attempted  to  anticipate  and  assess  the  im- 
portance  of some  of  the  practical  problems  that  might 
arise  in  the  implementation  of  the  indexing  scheme. 
Generally,  however,  he  thought  that  such  difficulties 
would  be  minor.  For  example,  he  recognized  that 
the  government  might  be  tempted  to  tamper  with 
the  index  to  achieve  certain  policy  goals  or  to  favor 
specific  political  factions  and  socio-economic  groups. 
But  he  thought  that  full  disclosure  of  data  would 
prevent  such  tampering.  As  he  put  it,  government 
officials  “would  be  required  to  publish  periodically 
the  detailed  tables  of  prices  upon  which  their  calcu- 
lations  were  founded,  and  thus  many  persons  could 
sufficiently  verify  the  data  and  the  calculations. 
Fraud  would  be  out  of  the  question.”  [9 ; 332] 
The  only  real  implementation  problem  he  foresaw 
was  that  of  selecting  the  most  suitable  index  number. 
With  regard  to  the  question  of  the  most  appropriate 
index  to  use,  Jevons  discussed  several  technical  prob- 
lems  of  index  number  construction,  including  the 
number  of  individual  commodity  prices  to  enter  in 
the  index,  the  criteria  used  in  choosing  the  prices, 
and  the  best  method  of  averaging  the  prices.  He 
expressed  a  definite  preference  for  an  index  num- 
ber  composed  of  the  geometric  mean  of  100  com- 
modity  price  ratios  “chosen  with  special  regard  to  the 
independence  of their  fluctuations  one  from  another.” 
[9 ; 332]  Although  he  indicated  that  this  particular 
index  number  was  his  first  choice,  he  concluded  that 
the  use  of  any  one  of  several  formulas  (e.g.,  those 
embodying  arithmetic  rather  than  geometric  averages 
of commodity  prices)  would  provide  a far  more  stable 
standard  of  deferred  payments  than  that  provided  by 
money. 
The  extent  of  Jevon’s  enthusiastic  endorsement  of 
indexation  is  most  clearly  evident  in  the  following 
passage  enumerating  “the  advantages  which  would 
arise  from  the  establishment  of  a  national  tabular 
standard  of  value.”  Indexation,  he  writes, 
would add a wholly  new degree of  stability  to social 
relations,  securing  the fixed  incomes  of  individuals 
and public institutions  from  the depreciation  which 
they-have  often  suffered.  Speculation,  too,  based 
upon the frequent  oscillations  of  prices,  which  take 
place  in the present  state of  commerce, would  be to 
a  certain  extent  discouraged.  The  calculations  of 
merchants  would  be  less frequently  frustrated  by 
causes  beyond  their  own  control,  and  many  bank- 
ruptcies  would  be prevented.  Periodical  collapses 
of  credit  would  no  doubt  recur  from  time  to  time, 
but the  intensity  of  the  crises  would  be mitigated, 
because  as  prices  fell  the  liabilities  of  debtors 
would  decrease  approximately  in  the  same  ratio. 
[9;  333] 
It  is  apparent  from  the  above  passage  that  Jevons 
thought  of  index-linking  not  only  as  a  means  of 
ameliorating  the  injustice,  social  discontent,  and  po- 
litical  unrest  wrought  by  inflation  and  deflation,  but 
also  as  an  economic  stabilizer  that  would  reduce  the 
severity  of  business  fluctuations  stemming  from 
price-level  changes.  He  clearly  states  that  indexation 
would  prevent  falling  prices  from  increasing  the  real 
burden  of  business  debt,  thus  reducing  the  danger  of 
bankruptcies  and  collapses  that  might  intensify  cycli- 
cal  contractions.  It  is  also  obvious  that  Jevons  felt 
that  with  contracts  stated  in  real  terms,  both  uncer- 
tainty  and  speculation  would  be  reduced.  Conse- 
quently,  fewer  of  the  economy’s  scarce  resources 
would  be  diverted  from  production  to  purely  risk- 
bearing  and  gambling  activity.  Businessmen  would 
no  longer  have  to  gamble  on  future  price  level  de- 
velopments  in  making  their  investment  decisions. 
Real  rates  of  return  on  alternative  investment  proj- 
ects  could  be  gauged  more  accurately.  Fewer  re- 
sources  would  be  channeled  into  speculative  invest- 
ment  in  such  things  as  land  or  inventories  of  com- 
modities  to  the  detriment  of  investment  in productive 
capital.  The  result  would  be  a  more  efficient  pattern 
of  investment  and  resource  allocation.  In  sum,  in- 
dexation  would  permit  a  higher  and  more  stable 
level  of  real  output. 
Alfred  Marshall  Like  Jevons,  Marshall  was  also 
an  enthusiastic  advocate  of  the  tabular  standard,  a 
topic  that  he  discussed  with  great  force  and  con- 
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adoption  of  indexation  is  developed  most  fully,  how- 
ever,  in  his  celebrated  essay  “Remedies  for  Fluctu- 
ations  of  General  Prices”  which  appeared  in  the 
March  1887  issue  of  Contemporary  Review.  In  this 
article  Marshall  starts  out  by  distinguishing  between 
the  medium  of  exchange  function  of  money  and  its 
function  as  a  standard  of  deferred  payments.  Argu- 
ing  that  fluctuations  in  the  price  level  tend  to  render 
money  defective  as  a  standard  of  deferred  payments, 
he  suggested  that  this  latter  function  be  divorced 
from  money  and  assigned  to  the  tabular  standard. 
His  scheme  would,  as he  put  it,  relieve  “the  currency 
of  the  duty,  which  it  is  not  fitted  to  perform,  of 
acting  as  a  standard  of  value”  and  transfer  this  task 
to  “an  authoritative  standard  of  purchasing  power 
independent  of  the  currency.”  [12;  188]  This  ar- 
rangement,  said  Marshall,  would  mean  that  contracts 
with  a  time  dimension  would  be  stated  not  in  terms 
of a fixed  amount  of  money,  but  rather  in  terms  of  a 
standard  unit  of purchasing  power  based  on  an  index 
number  of  commodity  prices.  This  unit  of  purchas- 
ing  power,  which  he  suggested  “might  be  called  for 
shortness  simply  THE  UNIT,”  would  be  chosen  to 
equal  the  purchasing  power  of a  unit  of  money  as  of 
some  designated  base  date.  As  Marshall  explained  it, 
a  government  department  “having  ascertained  the 
prices  of  all  important  commodities,  would  publish 
from  time  to  time  the  amount  of  money  required  to 
give  the  same  general  purchasing  power  as,  say,  £1 
had  at  the  beginning  of  1887.”  This  information 
could  then  be used  to  determine  the  magnitude  of  the 
money  payments  necessary  to  discharge  or  settle  con- 
tracts  stated  in  terms  of  the  constant  purchasing- 
power  unit.  In  short,  the  “Unit”  would  serve  as  the 
standard  of  deferred  payments  leaving  money  free  to 
function  solely  as  a  medium  of  exchange.  Each 
instrument  would  be  assigned  the  function  that  it 
could  perform  most  efficiently.  Or,  as  Marshall  put 
it,  “if  we  have  one  thing  as  a  medium  of  exchange, 
and  another  as  a  standard  of value,  each  may  be able 
to  perform  its  share  of  the  work  thoroughly  well, 
because  it  is  specially  fitted  for  it.”  [12 ; 197] 
Unlike  Jevons,  Marshall  insisted  that  indexation 
be  strictly  voluntary,  i.e.,  “at  the  option  of  those 
concerned.”  But  he  obviously  hoped  it  would  gain 
widespread  usage,  for  he  advocated  its  application 
“without  delay”  to  loans,  salaries  and  wages,  ground 
rents,  and  even  to  wills  and  marriage  contracts  ; and 
he  urged  the  courts  to  ‘give  every  facility  to  con- 
tracts,  wills  and  other  documents  made  in  terms  of 
the  unit.”  Moreover,  he  suggested  that  the  govern- 
ment  set  an  example  for  the  private  sector  by  index- 
ing  its  own  affairs  whenever  possible.  Specifically, 
he  proposed  that  the  government:  (1)  index  the 
wages,  salaries,  and  pensions  of  its  employees;  (2) 
apply  a monetary  correction  to  the  tax  system,  which 
would  mean,  as  he  put  it,  “assessing  rates  and  taxes 
.  .  . in  terms  of  the  unit” ;  and  (3)  issue  an  index- 
linked  bond,  with  yield  and  principal  guaranteed  in 
terms  of the  standard  unit  of purchasing  power.  [12 ; 
198-9]  These  proposals  have  a  distinctly  modern 
ring,  especially  the  plan  to  index  the  tax  system. 
These  same  suggestions  are  frequently  offered  as 
partial  solutions  to  the  current  problem  of  inflation. 
In  describing  the  benefits  that  might  be  expected 
to  result  from  his  plan,  Marshall  stressed  its  stabi- 
lizing  effects  on  production  and  employment.  An 
indexed  economy,  he  claimed,  would  be  a  vast  im- 
provement  over  the  existing  non-indexed  economy 
in  which  “fluctuations  in  the  value  of  what  we  use 
as  our  standard  are  ever  either  flurrying  up  business 
activity  into  unwholesome  fever,  or  else  closing  fac- 
tories  and  workshops  by  the  thousands.”  [12 ; 192] 
In  the  particular  section  of his  1887 paper  devoted 
to  an  analysis  of  “the  evils  of  a  fluctuating  standard 
of  value,”  Marshall  enumerated  several  reasons  why 
movements  in  the  price  level  might  have  adverse 
impacts  on  output  and  employment  in  an  unindexed 
economy.  First,  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  money 
increase  business  risks,  thus  making  entrepreneurial 
decision-making  more  onerous  and  burdensome.  Ac- 
cording  to  Marshall,  not  only  does  the  entrepreneur 
“run  the  risk  that  the  things  which  he  handles  will 
fall  in value  relatively  to others,”  but  “in  addition,  he 
runs  the  risk  that  the  standard  in  which  he  has  to 
pay  back  what  he  has  borrowed  will  be  a  different 
one  from  that  by  which  his  borrowing  was  mea- 
sured.”  The  former  risk,  Marshall  states,  “is  inevi- 
table,  it  must  be  endured.”  [12 ;  190]  The  latter 
risk,  however,  is  unnecessary:  it  can  be  eliminated 
via  adoption  of a  stable  standard  of value. 
A  second  and  more  important  factor  contributing 
to  the  severity  of  business  cycles  in  an  unindexed 
economy  is  the  rigidity  of  money  wages,  salaries, 
interest  rates,  and  other  business  expenses.  When 
the  price  level  is  changing,  these  inflexible  money 
costs  are  translated  into  perverse  movements  in  real 
costs,  rising  in  periods  of  price  deflation  and  falling 
in  times  of  price  inflation.  These  perverse  move- 
ments  in  real  costs  contribute  greatly  to  economic 
instability,  encouraging  reckless  overexpansion  in 
periods  of  inflation  and  creating  unemployment  in 
periods  of  deflation.  In  an  inflationary  boom,  for 
example,  “when  prices  are  rising  and  the  purchasing 
power  of  money  is  falling  .  .  .  the  employer  pays 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  9 smaller  real  salaries  and  wages  than  usual,  at  the 
very  time  when  his  profits  are  largest.”  The  result 
of  the  inflation-induced  fall  in  real  wages  and  the 
consequent  expansionary  impact  on  profits,  Marshall 
claims,  is that  the  entrepreneur  “is  thus  prompted  to 
over-estimate  his  strength,  and  engage  in  ventures 
which  he will  not  be able  to pull  through  after  the  tide 
begins  to  turn.”  Similarly,  inflation-induced  declines 
in  real  interest  costs,  like  falling  real  wages,  also 
contribute  to  the  boom.  When  nominal  interest  rates 
lag  behind  rising  prices,  “those  working  on  borrowed 
capital  pay  back  less  real  value  than  they  borrowed.” 
Consequently,  “people  rush  to  borrow  money  and  buy 
goods,  and  thus  help  prices  to  rise ;  business  is  in- 
flated,  it  is managed  recklessly  and  wastefully.”  [12 ; 
190-l]  In  brief,  the  failure  of inflexible  money  wages 
and  nominal  interest  rates  to  move  in  step  with  the 
price  level  results  in an  enlargement  of profits  during 
the  upswing,  thus  encouraging  reckless  speculation 
and  wasteful  business  expansion. 
Similarly,  when  product  prices  and  nominal  sales 
receipts  are  falling,  sticky  money  wages  and  inflexible 
nominal  interest  rates  eat  into  profits,  thereby  in- 
ducing  employers  to  cut  back  output  and  lay  off 
workers.  The  following  passage,  referring  specifi- 
cally  to  rigid  money  wages,  aptly  summarizes  Mar- 
shall’s  view  of  how  the  downward  inflexibility  of 
business  costs  in  general  is  transformed  via  falling 
prices  into  absolute  declines  in  the  level  of  aggregate 
economic  activity.  In  such  deflationary  times,  Mar- 
shall  says: 
it would often  be well  . . . that the employees should 
take  rather  less  real  wages  than  in  times  of  pros- 
perity.  But,  in  fact,  since  wages  and  salaries  are 
reckoned  in  money  which  is  rising  in  value,  the 
employer  pays  higher  real  wages  than  usual  at 
such a time unless he can get money wages reduced. 
This  is a difficult  task, partly  because the employ- 
ees,  not  altogether  unreasonably,  fear  that  when 
nominal  wages  are  once  let  down  they  will  not  be 
easily  raised.  So  they  are  inclined  to  stop  work 
rather  than accept  a nominal reduction  even though 
it  would  not  be  a  real  one.  The  employer,  on  his 
part,  finds  a  stoppage  his easiest  course  . . . .  He 
may  not  happen  to  remember  that  every  stoppage 
of work in any one trade  diminishes  the demand for 
the work  of  others;  and that,  if  all trades  tried  to 
improve  the  market  by  stopping  their  work  to- 
gether,  the  only  result  would  be  that  every  one 
would  have  less  of  everything  to  consume.  [12 ; 
191-2] 
How  could  these  fluctuations  in  output  and  em- 
ployment  be  reduced?  The  obvious  solution,  said 
Marshall,  is indexation.  With  nominal  wages  linked 
to  a  price  index,  “their  real  value  would  then  no 
longer  fluctuate  constantly  in  the  wrong  direction, 
tending  upwards  just  when  .  .  .  it  should  fall,  and 
tending  downward  just  when  .  .  .  it  should  rise.” 
Likewise,  the  indexation  of  loans  would  also  con- 
tribute  to  economic  stability,  because  borrowers 
“would  not  be  at  one  time  impatient  to  start  ill- 
considered  enterprises  in  order  to  gain  by  the  ex- 
pected  rise  in  general  prices,  and  at  another  afraid 
of  borrowing  for  legitimate  business  for  fear  of being 
caught  by  a  general  fall  in  prices.”  [12 ;  198]  In 
short,  by  helping  to  maintain  real  wages  and  real 
interest  rates  constant  between  periods  of  rising  and 
falling  prices,  indexation  would  tend  to  lessen  the 
amplitude  and  duration  of  business  cycles.  Further- 
more,  by  eliminating  the  risk  and  uncertainty  asso- 
ciated  with  a  fluctuating  standard  of  value-a  risk 
that  Marshall  calls  “a  great  cause  of the  discontinuity 
of industry”-  indexation  would  help  insure  the  main- 
tenance  of  continual  full  employment. 
Finally,  mention  should  be  made  of  Marshall’s 
views  on  the  question  of  the  appropriate  index  num- 
ber  to  use  in  index-linked  contracts.  Generally, 
Marshall  thought  that  the  particular  index  chosen 
was  a  secondary  consideration  and  that  any  reason- 
ably  comprehensive  index  would  suffice  for  practical 
purposes.  Pointing  out  that  all  index  numbers  have 
shortcomings,  he  stated  that  “we  cannot  hope  to  get  a 
standard  of  purchasing  power  which  is  free  from 
great  imperfections.”  In  fact,  “an  absolutely  per- 
fect  standard  of  purchasing  power  is  not  only  un- 
attainable  but  even  unthinkable.”  Imperfections  not- 
withstanding,  any  index,  Marshall  felt,  would  create 
a  more  stable  standard  in  real  terms  than  that 
afforded  by money.  What  matters,  Marshall  thought, 
is  not  so  much  which  index  to  use-all  of  them 
being  imperfect-  but  that  the  decision  be  made  to 
use  one.  Even  the  crudest  and  most  convenient 
index,  he  argued,  would  provide  “a  tenfold  better 
standard  of  value  than  that  afforded  by  the  precious 
metals.”  [12;  207,  211] 
Irving  Fisher  Among  neo-classical  economists, 
Irving  Fisher  provided  perhaps  the  clearest  and  most 
succinct  description  of  indexation  and  how  it  would 
work.  Fisher’s  discussion  of  indexing,  or  the  tabular 
standard  of  value  as  he  called  it,  appears  in  Chapter 
13  of  his  classic  The  Purchasing  Power  of  Money 
(1911),  a  chapter  devoted,  appropriately  enough,  to 
“The  Problem  of  Making  Purchasing  Power  More 
Stable.”  He  discusses  the  concept  also  in  Chapter  10, 
which  is  devoted  to  a  technical  analysis  of  index 
numbers,  their  purpose  and  construction.  It  is  signi- 
ficant  that  in  this  latter  chapter  he  notes  that  “per- 
haps  the  most  important  purpose  of  index  numbers 
is  to  serve  as  a  basis  of  loan  contracts.”  [3 ; 208] 
According  to  Fisher,  the  essence  of  the  tabular 
standard  consists  of  the  principle  that  “contracts 
could  be  expressed  in  terms  of  an  index  number.” 
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out, 
The  money  of  the  country  would  continue  to  be 
used  as  a  medium  of  exchange  and  as  a  measure 
of  value,  but  not  as  a  standard  for  all  deferred 
payments.  The standard  of  deferred  payments  . . . 
would  be the  index  number  of  general  prices;  and 
contracts  involving  deferred  payment  could,  when 
desired, call for  the exchange  of a given  purchasing 
power,  or  of  an amount  of  money  varying  directly 
with  the  index  number.  [3 ;  333] 
Although  the  value  of  money  would  continue  to  fluc- 
tuate  under  such  an  arrangement,  “contracts  based  on 
index  numbers  would  not  be affected  because  made  in 
terms  of  the  index  number.” 
Indexation,  Fisher  argued,  “would  appeal  strongly 
to  certain  classes,”  who  “would  like  to  be  guaranteed 
a  stable  purchasing  power.”  Examples  might  be  “a 
widow,  or  a  trustee,  or  other  long-time  investor.” 
Such  people  “would  prefer  to  buy  bonds  which 
guaranteed  a  regular  yearly  purchasing  power  over 
subsistence,  rather  than  those  which  merely  promised 
a given  sum  of  money  of  uncertain  value.”  [3 ; 333] 
Concerning  the  practical  problem  of  how  an  econ- 
omy  might  move  from  a  non-indexed  to  an  indexed 
standard  of  value,  Fisher  thought  that  the  process 
might  involve  two  stages.  In  the  first  stage,  in- 
dexation  would  be  adopted  solely  on  a  voluntary 
basis,  with  individuals  deciding  at  their  own  dis- 
cretion  whether  contracts  should  be  made  “in  terms 
of  money”  or  “in  terms  of  the  index  number.” 
In  cases  where  the  latter  option  was  chosen,  a  pur- 
chasing-power  clause  or  “specific  proviso,”  as 
Fisher  termed  it,  would  have  to  be  inserted  in  the 
agreement.  The  only  role  envisioned  for  the  govern- 
ment  in this  initial  stage  would  be that  of encouraging 
voluntary  adoption  of  indexation.  According  to 
Fisher,  two  steps  could  be  taken  in  this  direction. 
First,  the  government  could  pass  legislation  per- 
mitting  index-linked  adjustments.  Such  legislation, 
said  Fisher,  “would  not  be  necessary,  but  it  might 
serve  to  draw  attention  to  the  index  method.”  It 
would,  of  course,  also  remove  legal  barriers  hamper- 
ing  the  adoption  of  indexation.  As  a  second  step  in 
facilitating  the  adoption  of  indexation,  “it  might  be 
well  for  the  government  to  inaugurate  an  authorized 
system  of  index  numbers,”  although  this  step  also 
would  not  be  absolutely  necessary  since  contracting 
parties  could  use,  in  Fisher’s  words,  “some  index 
number  already  in  vogue,  such  as  Sauerbeck’s  or  the 
Bureau  of  Labor’s.”  In  short,  the  government’s  role 
in  the  first  stage  would  be  a  relatively  passive  one  of 
permitting  and  facilitating  the  voluntary  adoption  of 
indexation.  After  purchasing-power  clauses  had 
gained  favor  and  had  ceased  to  be a novelty,  however, 
the  government  might  take  a  more  active  role,  per- 
haps  even  making  indexation  virtually  compulsory.  In 
this  connection,  Fisher  writes  that  if the  index-linked 
“form  of  contract  should  become  more  general  .  .  . 
legislation  could  be passed,  making  the  index  number 
the  standard  in  all  cases.”  Generally,  Fisher  felt 
that  a  system  of  indexation  must  be  fairly  compre- 
hensive  if  it  is  to  be  successful.  As  he  put  it, 
“halfway  adoption”  of  indexation  “would  really 
aggravate  many  of the  evils  it sought  to correct.”  [3 : 
332-4,  336] 
One  of  Fisher’s  contributions  was  his  clear  and 
thorough  analysis  of  the  objectives  and  purposes  of 
indexation.  He  argued,  first,  that  the  correction  of 
injustice  between  debtor  and  creditor  was  not  a 
legitimate  function  of  indexation,  primarily  because 
no  such  deliberate  inequity  was  wrought  by  price 
level  changes.  His  position  on  the  question  of  dis- 
tributive  justice  is  perhaps  best  summarized  in  the 
following  quotation. 
The  question  of  justice  between  borrower  and 
lender,  where  the  purpose  is  to  fix  on  the  best 
index number  as a standard  of  deferred  payments, 
was  also  considered.  It  was  seen  to  be not  an 
infringement  of  justice  that  one  man  should  gain 
from  another  on  account  of  fluctuations  in  the 
money  standard;  for  the  contract  is  a free  one  in 
which  normally  each  should  assume  whatever  risk 
there  may  be  of  loss  for  the  sake  of  whatever 
chance  there  may  be of  gain.  [3;  232] 
Similarly,  he  pointed  out  that  indexation  cannot 
protect  real  incomes  from  changes  stemming  from 
natural  disasters  (e.g.,  drought,  crop  failures,  etc.), 
depletion  and  exhaustion  of natural  resource  supplies, 
and  other  exogenous  non-monetary  causes.  Nobody, 
said  Fisher,  should  “expect  the  monetary  unit  to 
insure  him  against  every  wind  that  blows.”  Else- 
where  he  states  that  indexation  cannot  be  a  “safe- 
guard  . . . against  all possible  elements  of change,  but 
only  against  those  elements  which  are  purely  mone- 
tary.”  For  example,  “a  secure  monetary  standard 
cannot  guarantee  against  earthquake.”  In  the  same 
vein,  he  notes  that  indexation  cannot  protect  against 
“industrial  changes”  or  the  “general  effects  of  inven- 
tion  or  progress.”  Perhaps  the  point  is  summarized 
best  in  Fisher’s  statement  that  “it  is  no  part  of  the 
function  of  an  index  number  of  general  prices  to 
guard  against  rising  and  falling  real  income.”  [3 : 
223-4, 232] 
According  to  Fisher,  the  main  objectives  of  the 
tabular  standard  would  be  to  eliminate  or  reduce  (1) 
the  uncertainty  and  (2)  the  harmful  distributional 
and  economic  effects  stemming  from  unforeseen 
changes  in  the  price  level.  In  reference  to  the  first 
objective,  Fisher  states  that  the  rationale  of the  index 
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prices,  in  order  that,  in  contracts  involving  deferred 
payments,  there  shall  be  no  element  of  risk  so  far  as 
money  is concerned.”  In  this  connection  he mentions 
elsewhere  that  it  is  “sound  public  policy”  to  reduce 
“the  risk  element”  thus  allowing  contracts  to  be made 
“on  the  most  certain  basis  possible.”  [3;  210,  232] 
Concerning  the  second  objective  of  the  tabular 
standard,  Fisher  stated  that,  without  indexation,  fluc- 
tuations  in  the  price  level  “influence  the  distribution 
of  wealth  among  persons  and  classes,”  and,  even 
more  importantly,  “bring  about  crises  and  business 
depressions.”  “It  is  desirable,”  he  said,  “that  some 
basis  for  time  contracts  should  be  fixed  upon  which 
will  remedy  these  evils.”  Accordingly,  he  proposed 
that  “an  index  number  expressing  the  price  level  . . . 
be adopted  as  such  a basis.”  [3 ; 233] 
Like  Jevons  and  Marshall,  Fisher  argued  that 
indexation  would  operate  to  stabilize  real  economic 
activity  by  dampening  the  amplitude  of  the  business 
cycle.  According  to  Fisher,  business  cycles  result 
primarily  because  of  a  lag  in  the  adjustment  of 
nominal  interest  rates  to  price  level  changes.  The 
reason  for  this  lag  is  “imperfect  foresight,”  i.e., 
actual  price  changes  are  neither  completely  antici- 
pated  nor  fully  incorporated  into  nominal  interest 
rates.  In  short,  incomplete  price  expectations  create 
a  discrepancy  between  actual  and  anticipated  price 
changes.  This  discrepancy  causes  nominal  and  real 
interest  rates  to  move  in  opposite  directions,  gener- 
ating  cyclical  disturbances  in  the  process.  Thus, 
when  prices  are  rising,  nominal  interest  rates  do  not 
rise  sufficiently  ;  and,  consequently,  real  rates  fall. 
Businessmen  take  advantage  of  these  falling  real 
rates  by  borrowing  from  banks  in  order  to  finance 
expansions  of  production.  Moreover,  the  interest- 
induced  rise  in loans  is accompanied  by  a correspond- 
ing  increase  in  bank  deposits,  spurring  further  rises 
in  the  price  level.  In  brief,  it  is  the  lagging  nominal 
interest  rate  and  consequent  fall  in  the  real  rate  that 
stimulates  the  boom.  Similarly,  in  a  downswing, 
when  prices  are  falling,  nominal  interest  rates  again 
lag  behind  prices,  causing  real  rates  to  rise.  Busi- 
nessmen  react  to  rising  real  rates  by  reducing  bor- 
rowing  and  cutting  production.  Moreover,  the 
reduction  in  the  volume  of bank  loans  is accompanied 
by  a  corresponding  contraction  in  deposits,  thus  in- 
ducing  prices  to  fall  even  further.  The  depression 
phase  of the  cycle  also  may  be  intensified  by  business 
bankruptcies  and  collapses  caused  by  deflation-in- 
duced  rises  in  real  debt  burdens.  Essentially,  how- 
ever,  lags  in  the  adjustment  of  nominal  interest  rates 
are  responsible  for  the  slump. 
According  to  Fisher,  indexation  would  dampen 
the  cycle  by  speeding  the  adjustment  of  nominal 
interest  rates  to  price  changes.  With  nominal  rates 
moving  in  step  with  prices,  real  rates  would  remain 
unaffected  by  inflation  and  deflation.  And  with  real 
rates  stable  over  the  cycle,  there  would  be  no  ab- 
normal  encouragement  or  discouragement  of  capital 
investment  and  the  demand  for  loans.  Consequently, 
the  amplitude  of fluctuations  in real  economic  activity 
would  be  diminished.  Moreover,  fluctuations  in  the 
price-level  itself  also  would  be  reduced-a  result  of 
the  index-induced  stabilization  of  the  volume  of  bank 
loans  and  hence  the  corresponding  demand  deposit 
component  of  the  money  supply.  Since,  in  Fisher’s 
view,  variation  in  the  money  stock  is  the  primary 
determinant  of  price  level  movements,  it  follows  that 
the  smoothing  of  cyclical  swings  in  the  quantity  of 
deposit  money  would  tend  to  dampen  oscillations  in 
the  price  level. 
This  last  point,  incidentally,  was  novel  and  unique 
to  Fisher’s  analysis.  Other  neoclassical  analysts  had 
argued  that  indexation  would  help  stabilize  real  eco- 
nomic  activity  during  price  fluctuations.  But  Fisher 
was  the  only  one  to  state  explicitly  that  indexation 
would  also  dampen  variations  in  the  price  level.  His 
position  on  this  point  is summarized  in the  following 
passage. 
The  system  of  making  contracts  in  terms  of  the 
price  level  is not  intended  directly  to  prevent  fluc- 
tuations  in  price  level.  Its  purpose  is  rather  to 
prevent  these fluctuations  from  introducing  a spec- 
ulative  element  into  business.  But  an  incidental 
result  of  the  system  would  be  that  fluctuations  in 
the  level  of  prices  would  be  less  than  before,  be- 
cause  credit  cycles  would  no  longer  be  stimulated. 
The  alternate  abnormal  encouragement  and  dis- 
couragement  of  loans  would  cease.  Hence,  credit 
fluctuations  would  become  less,  and  the  level  of 
prices  would  be comparatively  unaffected  by them. 
[3;  336] 
Fisher’s  discussion  of  the  stabilization  role  of  in- 
dexation  calls  for  one  final  comment.  Throughout 
his  analysis  he  specifically  refers  to  unanticipated 
fluctuations  in  the  price  level.  Indexation,  he  points 
out,  would  not  be  necessary  if  all  price  level  changes 
could  be  accurately  anticipated  and  fully  adjusted 
to.  As  he  put  it,  “our  ideal  is  not  primarily  con- 
stancy  of  the  dollar  but  rather  dependability.  Fluc- 
tuations  which  can  be  foreseen  and  allowed  for  are 
not  evils.”  [3 ; 223]  In such  cases  the  nominal  rate 
of  interest  would  adjust  fully  and  instantaneously  to 
compensate  for  the  correctly  anticipated  price  change. 
Correspondingly,  the  real  interest  rate  would  be free 
of  investment-influencing  distortions. 
Unfortunately,  however,  price  anticipations  are 
rarely  perfect.  In  Fisher’s  words,  “experience  shows 
that  the  rate  of  interest  will  seldom  adjust  itself 
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changes  are  only  in  part  foreseen.”  [3 ;  210]  By 
linking  interest  payments  to  actual  price  movements, 
however,  indexation  in  effect  eliminates  from  real 
yields  the  investment-distorting  discrepancy  between 
actual  and  anticipated  price  changes.  Or,  as  Fisher 
expressed  it,  indexation  provides  a  system  “by  which 
the  actual  results  of  the  contract  should  closely 
approximate  the  expected  results  in  nearly  all cases.” 
[3 ;  233] 
Although  he  was  not  as  enthusiastic  an  advocate 
of  indexation  as  were  Jevons  and  Marshall,  Fisher, 
in  1911, was  generally  in favor  of  the  device,  as  indi- 
cated  by  his  statement  that  “on  the  whole,  the  tabular 
standard  seems  to  have  real  merit.”  He  did,  how- 
ever,  devote  particular  attention  to  some  “serious  if 
not  fatal  objections”  to  the  scheme.  Among  the 
specific disadvantages  he  discussed  were:  (1)  foreign 
exchange  and  international  payments  problems  that 
indexation  might  impose  on  a  single  country  oper- 
ating  in  a  world  of  unindexed  economies;  (2)  the 
costs  and  inconveniences  of  converting  purchasing 
power  clauses  into  money  terms  for  payments  pur- 
poses  ;  (3)  bookkeeping  complications  resulting  from 
the  necessity  of  using  a  double  system  of  accounts  ; 
and  (4)  difficulties  stemming  from  the  incomplete 
adoption  of  the  scheme,  particularly  the  distortions 
introduced  into  profit  and  loss  statements  by  a double 
standard  of  deferred  payments.  In  connection  with 
the  first  disadvantage,  Fisher  conceded  that  a  single 
indexed  economy  would  be  forced  onto  a  regime  of 
floating  exchange  rates,  “thus  reintroducing  the  in- 
conveniences  of  an  uncertain  rate  of international  ex- 
change.”  And  regarding  the  problem  of  incomplete 
indexation,  Fisher  remarked  that  “halfway  adoption” 
of  the  scheme  would  “aggravate  many  of  the  evils  it 
sought  to  correct.”  Specifically,  he  pointed  out  the 
difficulties  that  the  individual  businessman  would 
face  if his  expenses  but  not  his  receipts  were  indexed. 
A  business man’s  profits  constitute  a narrow  mar- 
gin  between receipts  and expenses.  If  receipts  and 
expenses  could  both  be  reckoned  in  the  tabular 
standard,  his  profits  would  be more  stable  than  if 
both were reckoned in money.  But if he should pay 
some  of  his  expenses,  such  as  interest  and  wages, 
on a tabular  basis,  while  his  receipts  remained  on 
the gold basis, his profits  would  fluctuate  far  more 
than  if  both  sides,  or  all  items  of  the  accounts, 
were  in  gold.  In  fact,  his  expected  profits  would 
often  turn  into losses by a slight  deviation  between 
the two  standards  . . . .  [3 ;  336] 
In  spite  of  these  potential  difficulties,  Fisher  at- 
tempted  to  put  indexation  to  practical  use  in  enter- 
prises  with  which  he  was  associated.  Thus  he  re- 
marks  that  he  “was  apparently  the  first  in  this 
country  to  introduce  the  index  wage  for  the  purpose 
of  offsetting  the  rising  cost  of  living  in  the  World 
War.”  And  in  1925  the  Rand  Kardex  Co.,  at  his 
recommendation,  issued  a  30-year  purchasing  power 
bond  with  interest  and  principal  linked  to  the  whole- 
sale  price  index.  These  experiments  were  not  suc- 
cessful,  however.  The  index-linked  bonds  eventually 
were  retired  in  favor  of more  marketable  gold  clause 
bonds.  As  for  the  index-linked  wages,  Fisher  re- 
ported  that  his  workers  were  unable  to  perceive  that 
the  purpose  of the  scheme  was  to  stabilize  real  wages. 
Thus,  he  said,  during  the  wartime  inflation,  his  em- 
ployees  “welcomed  the  swelling  contents  of  their 
‘High  Cost  of  Living’  pay  envelopes.  They  thought 
their  wages  were  increasing,  though  it  was  carefully 
explained  to  them  that  their  real  wages  were  merely 
standing  still.  But  as  soon  as  the  cost  of  living  fell 
they  resented  the  ‘reduction’  in  wages,  and  refused 
to  believe  that  their  real  wages  were  not  reduced 
thereby.”  [4 ; 387-9]  These  experiences  left  Fisher 
convinced  of  “the  practical  omnipresence  of  the 
‘money  illusion’  and  of  the  impracticability  of  index 
wages  and  index  bonds  as  a  general  solution  of  the 
great  problem  of  unstable  money.”  The  only  feasible 
general  solution  to  the  problem  of  inflation  and  defla- 
tion,  he  thought,  was  proper  regulation  of  the  money 
supply.  His  own  pet  stabilization  scheme,  the  cele- 
brated  “compensated  dollar”  proposal,  called  for  reg- 
ulation  of  the  gold  content  of the  dollar,  and  thus  the 
quantity  of  money  supportable  by  a  given  gold  base, 
by  reference  to  an index  number  of commodity  prices. 
Using  the  price  index  as  a  guide,  the  authorities 
would  vary  the  price  of  gold  and  hence  the  quantity 
of money  in order  to  maintain  stability  of the  general 
price  level. 
ARGUMENTS  FOR  INDEXED  GOVERNMENT  BONDS 
So  far,  this  article  has  concentrated  on  those 
analysts  who  favored  the  application  of  indexation  to 
a  fairly  wide  range  of  debts  and/or  incomes.  In 
addition,  there  have  been  many  writers  who,  while 
not  necessarily  advocating  comprehensive  indexation, 
nevertheless  proposed  that  the  principle  be  applied 
to  specific  types  of  loan  contracts.  For  example, 
earlier  in  this  century  several  economists  proposed 
the  issue  of  index-linked  government  bonds.  Thus, 
John  Maynard  Keynes,  in  his  1924 testimony  before 
the  Colwyn  Committee  on  National  Debt  and  Tax- 
ation,  argued that  the  British  Treasury  should  issue 
bonds  of  which  the  capital  and  interest  would  be 
paid  not  in a fixed  amount  of  sterling  but  in  such 
amount  of  sterling  as has a fixed  commodity  value 
as indicated  by an index  number.  [2 ;  278, 287] 
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advantage:  in  addition  to  protecting  the  holder  from 
the  depreciation  of  the  value  of  money,  they  would 
reduce  the  cost  of  borrowing  to  the  Treasury.  Ac- 
cording  to  Keynes,  the  Treasury  gains  by  tailoring 
its  issues  to  the  tastes  and  preferences  of  different 
groups  of  investors,  including  those  with  a preference 
for  purchasing-power  security  over  yield,  Indexed 
bonds  would  appeal  to  this  latter  group,  which  would 
be willing  to  sacrifice  yield  for  the  purchasing-power 
guarantee,  thus  lowering  the  cost  of borrowing  to  the 
Treasury.  This  argument  of  course  assumes  that 
inflation  would  not  occur  during  the  life  of  the  bond  ; 
otherwise  the  index-linked  interest  cost  might  rise. 
A  proposal  similar  to  Keynes’s  was  advanced  in 
1941 by  George  L.  Bach  and  Richard  A.  Musgrave  in 
their  note  on  “A  Stable  Purchasing  Power  Bond.” 
In  this  note,  Bach  and  Musgrave  stressed  the  poten- 
tial  anti-inflationary  stabilization  effects  of  indexed 
government  bonds.  They  suggested,  first,  that  the 
availability  of  such  securities  might  increase  the  in- 
centive  to  save,  thus  reducing  the  amount  of  con- 
sumption  spending  out  of  any  given  level  of  income. 
Second,  they  argued  that  indexed  bonds  might  induce 
people  to  hold  their  wealth  in  a  relatively  non-infla- 
tionary  form.  They  pointed  out  that  the  anticipation 
of  inflation  discourages  the  holding  of  wealth  in  the 
form  of  money  or  fixed-dollar  bonds  and  encourages 
purchases  of  real  assets,  especially  consumer  durable 
goods.  Thus,  during  inflationary  periods,  people 
will  attempt  to  shift  out  of  money  into  consumer 
durables,  and  the  increased  spending  for  the  latter 
assets  will  accentuate  inflation.  Contrariwise,  if 
people  were  provided  the  alternative  of  shifting  from 
money  assets  into  a  stable  purchasing-power  bond,  a 
smaller  proportion  of  wealth  “would  be  devoted  to 
‘forward  buying’  of  durables.”  [1 ;  823] 
Similarly,  Bach  and  Musgrave  claimed  that  an 
indexed  bond  would  tend  to  stabilize  the  cyclical 
pattern  of  commodity  inventory  investment.  During 
booms,  a guaranteed  purchasing-power  security,  they 
asserted,  would  compete  favorably  as  an  investment 
with  the  speculative  buying  and  hoarding  of  com- 
modities.  Consequently,  bonds  would  be  purchased 
at  the  expense  of  commodity  hoarding,  thereby 
lessening  inflationary  pressure. 
Another  argument  was  that  purchasing-power 
bonds  would  absorb  accumulated  idle  cash  balances 
that  otherwise  might  later  contribute  to  inflationary 
spending.  Bach  and  Musgrave  also  contended  that 
such  bonds  would  provide  the  government  with  an 
incentive  to  control  inflation.  That  is,  by  imposing 
upon  the  government  the  threat  of  increased  debt 
service  charges  if  inflation  occurs,  indexed  bonds 
“may  exert  a  wholesome  pressure  on  Congress  to 
adopt  aggressive  anti-inflationary  policies.”  [1;  823] 
Finally,  Bach  and  Musgrave  argued  that  an  indexed 
bond  would  provide  protection  for  small  savers  and 
other  investors  seeking  security  of  capital  in  terms 
of  purchasing  power  first  and  yield  second. 
Virtually  this  same  list  of  arguments  in  support 
of an  indexed  bond  reappeared  a  decade  later  (1951) 
in  several  economists’  replies  to  a  questionnaire  pre- 
pared  by  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Economic  Re- 
port.  [10]  Incidentally,  one  of  the  respondents  was 
Milton  Friedman,  whose  reply  contains  his  earliest 
written  statement  in  support  of  an  index-linked 
bond.  These  examples  indicate  that  the  concept  of 
index-linked  bonds  was  commonplace  long  before  the 
current  inflationary  experience  revived  interest  in 
them. 
COMPARISON  OF  CONTEMPORARY 
WITH  EARLIER VIEWS 
This  article  has  sketched  the  historical  evolution 
of  the  concept  of  indexation  from  its  early  18th 
century  origins,  through  its  subsequent  development 
and  elaboration  by  19th  century  classical  and  neo- 
classical  analysts,  and  finally  to  its  treatment  by 
earlier  20th  century  economists.  Perhaps  the  main 
proposition  emerging  from  this  body  of  writing  is 
the  claim  that  indexation  might  help  to  insulate  real 
economic  variables  from  the  destabilizing  effects  of 
unanticipated  changes  in the  price  level.  According  to 
the  classical  and  neo-classical  writers  surveyed  in  the 
article,  indexation  would  promote  the  stabilization  of 
economic  activity  (1)  by  reducing  the  business  risks 
and  uncertainties  of  unforeseen  changes  in  the  value 
of  money  and  (2)  by  insuring  that  nominal  wage, 
interest,  and  other  costs  adjust  swiftly  and  completely 
to  price-level  changes,  thus  keeping  real  costs  largely 
unaffected  by  inflation  and  deflation  over  the  cycle. 
These  same  propositions  appear  prominently  in 
contemporary  discussions  of  indexation.  Thus,  for 
example,  Milton  Friedman  lays  particular  emphasis 
on  the  stabilizing  or  insulating  properties  of  index- 
ation  when  he  states  that  widespread  use  of  escalator 
clauses  “would  reduce  the  adverse  side  effects  that 
effective  measures  to end  inflation  would  have  on out- 
put  and  employment.”  Similar  to  his  classical  and 
neo-classical  forebears,  Friedman  argues  that  index- 
ation  would  achieve  this  result  in  two  ways.  First,  it 
would  eliminate  from  all  contracts  and  business 
decision-making  the  risks  of  unforeseen  changes  in 
the  price  level.  In  this  connection  he  writes  that 
14  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1974 the harmful  output  and  employment  effects  of changes 
in  the  rate  of  inflation  “fundamentally  reflect  .  .  . 
distortions  that  arise  because  contracts  are  entered 
into  under  mistaken  perceptions  about  the  likely 
course  of  inflation.  The  way  to  reduce  these  side 
effects  is  to  make  contracts  with  prices,  wages,  or 
interest  rates  stipulated  in  real  terms,  not  nominal 
terms.  This  can  be  done  through  widespread  use  of 
escalator  clauses.”  Elsewhere  he  points  out  that 
indexation  would  reduce  the  necessity  of  gambling 
or  speculating  on  what  the  rate  of  inflation  will  be, 
because,  as  he  expresses  it,  “businesses  will  be  able 
to  borrow  funds  or  enter  into  construction  contracts 
knowing  that  interest  rates  and  contract  prices  can 
be adjusted  later  on in accord  with  indexes  of prices.” 
Second,  like  his  classical  and  neo-classical  prede- 
cessors,  Friedman  maintains  that  indexation  would 
reduce  the  lag  of  nominal  wages  and  other  money 
costs  behind  prices,  thus  stabilizing  real  costs  and  the 
corresponding  real  variables  that  constitute  the  level 
of  economic  activity.  In  his  own  words,  indexation 
would  insure  that  “any  effects  on  prices  will  be 
promptly  transmitted  to  wage  contracts,  to  contracts 
for  future  delivery,  and  to  interest  rates  on  out- 
standing  long-term  loans.  Accordingly,  producers’ 
wage  costs  and  other  costs  will go up less  rapidly  than 
they  would  without  indexation.  This  tempering  of 
costs,  in turn,  will  encourage  employers  to  keep  more 
people  on  the  payroll,  and  produce  more  goods  than 
they  would  without  indexation.”  [8;  96,  176] 
In  short,  most  of  Friedman’s  propositions  and 
arguments  concerning  indexation  as  a  stabilization 
device  were  inherited  from  earlier  writers.  Even 
his proposition  that  indexation  makes  it easier  for  the 
authorities  to  bring  inflation  under  control  was  fully 
anticipated  by  G.  Poulett  Scrope,  who  contended 
that  the  function  of the  tabular  standard  was  to  make 
feasible  closer  monetary  control  over  prices. 
On  still  other  issues,  modern  proponents  of  index- 
ation  are  in  strict  accordance  with  the  views  of  their 
classical  and  neo-classical  counterparts.  Thus  when 
Friedman  urges  that  the  federal  government  index 
tax-scales  and  the  interest  on  government  securities, 
as  well  as  the  wages  and  pensions  of  government 
workers,  he  is merely  echoing  the  following  proposal 
made  by  Alfred  Marshall  in  1887. 
The  standard  unit  of  purchasing  power  being  pub- 
lished,  the  . . .  Government  itself  might  gradually 
feel  its way  towards  assessing  rates  and taxes  . . . 
in  terms  of  the  unit,  and  also  towards  reckoning 
the salaries,  pensions, and, when possible, the wages 
of  its  employees  at  so  many  units  instead  of  so 
much currency.  It  should, I think,  begin  by offer- 
ing, as soon as the unit was made, to pay  for  each 
£100  of  Consols  a really  uniform  interest  of  three 
units,  instead  of  a  nominally  uniform  but  really 
fluctuating  interest  of  £3.  [12 ;  199] 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  Friedman’s  argument 
that  indexation  of  the  graduated  tax  system  is neces- 
sary  to  prevent  the  government  from  appropriating 
an  increasing  fraction  of  total  personal  and  corporate 
income  was  foreshadowed  by  Scrope’s  contention  in 
1833 that  indexation  was  needed  to  relieve  the  “great 
pressure  which  is now  felt  from  the  excessive  burden 
imposed  by  taxation  on  the  springs  of  our  produc- 
tive  industry.”  [13 ; 409]  This  excessive  real  tax 
burden,  Scrope  explained,  resulted  from  the  failure 
of  the  government  to  adjust  its  nominal  tax-bill 
downwards  in  proportion  to  a falling  price  level. 
Friedman  also  agrees  with  his  classical  and  neo- 
classical  predecessors  on  the  question  of  the  scope 
or  range  of indexation.  His  version  of  a comprehen- 
sively-indexed  economy,  one  in  which,  as  he  puts  it, 
escalator  clauses  would  be applied  to  “all  transactions 
that  have  a  time  dimension,”  bears  a  close  resem- 
blance  both  to  Joseph  Lowe’s  plan  to  index  all  “time 
contracts”  or  “contracts  of  duration”  and  to  Jevons’s 
proposal  to  index  “every  money  debt  of,  say,  more 
than  three  months’  standing.”  And  when  Friedman 
asserts  that  “it  is  highly  desirable  that  the  practice 
of incorporating  escalator  clauses  be extended  to  a far 
wider  range  of wage  agreements,  contracts  for  future 
delivery  of  products,  and  financial  transactions  in- 
volving  borrowing  and  lending,”  he  sounds  very 
much  like  Marshall  who  favored  indexation  of  sal- 
aries  and  wages , ground-rents,  mortgages,  marriage 
settlements,  debentures,  common  stocks,  contracts, 
wills,  and  other  documents.  Finally,  it  should  be 
noted  that  Friedman  echoes  the  sentiments  of  most 
of  his  19th  century  predecessors  when  he  advocates 
the  voluntary  acceptance  of  escalator  clauses  in  the 
private  sector,  with  the  government’s  role  limited  to 
removing  “any  legal  obstacles”  to  their  adoption. 
To  summarize,  there  is  very  little  that  is  new  in 
contemporary  analyses  of  indexation.  Most  of  the 
key  concepts  and  arguments  already  had  been  fully 
and  repeatedly  stated  by  earlier  writers.  In  fact,  it 
would  not  be  an  overstatement  to  say  that  virtually 
all of the  major  contemporary  propositions  regarding 
indexation  were  inherited  without  serious  modifica- 
tion  from  classical  and  neo-classical  analysts.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  current  proposals  to  index  in- 
comes,  tax-scales,  and  time  contracts  should  be  re- 
garded  not  as  original  and  novel  schemes  but  rather 
as  the  revival  and  restatement  of  long-established 
ideas  thoroughly  familiar  to  earlier  economists. 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
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